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Th e majority of the world’s constitutions now include mention of a right to health or 
health care. Will the courts be eff ective at championing the health rights of vulnerable 
populations? Courts recognize that health systems embody complex tradeoff s, and 
have struggled to draw a principled line of deference to government decision-making. 
Worldwide, one fi nds courts drawing this line in various ways, depending, among 
other things, on their country’s constitutional aspirations, the maturity and internal 
accountability of its health system, and broader currents of social mobilization. For their 
part, Canadian courts have been very restrained, conceptualizing health rights largely 
in negative terms – overturning restrictions on access to abortion, medical marijuana, 
and so on – while refusing to recognize any positive duty on the part of government to 
provide particular health services. Could Canadian courts do more, without tumbling 
into overreach?  Th e paper ends by sketching options for a more robust and progressive 
approach to adjudicating health rights claims.
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I.  Introduction
The majority of the world’s constitutions now include mention of a right to health or health care. 1 Th ough in some countries health 
rights are purely symbolic or aspirational, it is often assumed that courts 
will play a role in holding governments accountable under these rights. 2 
Proponents of a rights-based approach believe (or hope) that “[r]ights 
remove discretion from development and provide a framework of 
accountability. Rights ensure services for the most marginalised and 
vulnerable populations, making it hard to claim progress by reference to 
1. Offi  ce of the UN High Commission for Human Rights, Th e Right to 
Health: Fact Sheet No. 31 (Geneva: UN High Commission for Human 
Rights, 2008). 
2. A recent study fi nds that approximately 70% of constitutions worldwide 
contain health-related guarantees, while the right is justiciable in 
approximately 40%. See Courtney Jung, Ran Hirschl & Evan Rosevear, 
“Economic and Social Rights in National Constitutions,” Am J Comp L 
[forthcoming] at 6-9, online: Social Science Research Network <http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2349680>.
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numerical aggregates.”3 Will health rights live up to this promise?4  
Answering this question is diffi  cult as a thorough comparative 
analysis is complicated, perhaps insurmountably, by various confounding 
factors.  Still, we can marshal what empirical evidence there is and rely on 
insights from experts in health law and policy across diff erent countries 
witnessing the litigation of health care rights.  In what follows, we explore 
the contextual factors that shape the impact of health care rights, moving 
from global trends to the specifi cs of the Canadian context. As a starting 
point, in Part I (below) we provide an overview of the basic dilemma 
facing courts as they venture into the adjudication of health care rights, 
namely, the challenge of staking out a legitimate institutional role and 
avoiding overreach into areas that are the purview of elected or executive 
bodies. Th is dilemma does not arise in a vacuum, however, and Part II 
explores some of the contextual factors that shape courts’ approaches 
to the adjudication of health rights, including national aspirations and 
constitutional traditions, the maturity of existing health systems, their 
mix of public/private fi nancing and administration and broader currents 
of social mobilization. As explained, these contextual factors may partly 
explain Canadian courts’ general conservatism vis-à-vis health rights, as 
compared to the bolder approach taken by courts in other countries. 
Of course, context does not wholly determine the path of health 
rights. Canadian courts have made pivotal interpretive choices, which 
have seriously limited the eff ectiveness of rights as an accountability 
mechanism in health care for marginalized groups. Part III explores 
Canadian jurisprudence in this arena, focusing on the Supreme 
Court’s largely ‘negative’ conception of the rights to life and security 
of the person, and its very restrained reading of the section 15 equality 
guarantee as it applies to health.  To date, these rights have done little 
3. Michel Sidibe & Kent Buse, “Global Health Governance After 2015 
– Authors’ Reply” Th e Lancet (21 September 2013) 382:9897, online: 
Th e Lancet <http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-
6736(13)61967-4/fulltext>.
4. Our discussion focuses largely on rights to health care, as this has been the 
primary focus of litigation in Canada and abroad. For ease of expression 
we will occasionally use the terms ‘health rights’ or ‘right to health,’ 
though strictly speaking this encompasses a broader range of interests (e.g. 
rights to public health prevention and equitable health outcomes).   
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to ensure accountability to vulnerable populations, and indeed the 
negative interpretation favoured by the Court is being used to challenge 
the legal foundations of universal health care. 5 Even taking into account 
the contextual factors that recommend judicial restraint in the Canadian 
context, the results have been disappointing. As will be explained, courts 
in similarly-situated countries, such as the UK, have had success in 
pressing for greater accountability in health care decision-making, while 
heeding the concern about overreach.  
II.   Th e Central Dilemma in Adjudicating Health   
 Rights
Th ough jurisdictions vary considerably in their approach to 
conceptualizing and enforcing health care rights, a basic concern arises 
irrespective of context – over the legitimacy of having courts oversee the 
allocation of health care resources. Decisions about the allocation of 
health care resources are ‘polycentric’ by nature, requiring robust evidence 
of complex tradeoff s at a systems level,6 while the courts’ institutional 
competence lies, it is claimed, in adjudicating discrete confl icts between 
two parties. As Christopher P. Manfredi and Antonia Maioni argue, 
Th e strength of the adversarial system is its capacity to sort through the 
historical facts about past events that transpired between disputing parties in 
order to implement retrospective remedies that will restore each party to the 
status it enjoyed prior to the dispute. By contrast, general policy formation 
requires the analysis of complex social facts about the relationship between 
ongoing phenomena in order to regulate those relationships prospectively. 7      
5. Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 35 [Chaoulli]; Canadian 
Independent Medical Clinics Association v Medical Services Commission of 
British Columbia (28 January 2009), Vancouver S-090663 (BCSC) (Writ 
of Summons of Plaintiff s) online: Medicare.ca <http://medicare.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2009/05/cimcawrit.pdf>.
6. Lon Fuller & Kenneth Winston, “Th e Forms and Limits of Adjudication” 
(1978) 92:2 Harv L Rev 353. 
7. Christopher P Manfredi & Antonia Maioni, “Judicializing Health Policy: 
Unexpected Lessons and an Inconvenient Truth” in James B Kelly & 
Christopher P Manfredi, eds, Contested Constitutionalism (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2009) 129 at 137. See also Kent Roach, “Th e Courts and 
Medicare: Too Much or Too Little Judicial Activism” in Colleen M Flood, 
Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, eds, Access to Care, Access to Justice: Th e Legal 
Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada (Toronto: University 
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Th e dilemma is especially vivid in lower income countries, where scarce 
resources often mean that one life can be saved at the expense of another. 
South Africa’s Constitutional Court acknowledged this reality in its 
often-cited Soobramoney ruling, as it declined to intervene on behalf of 
an elderly patient seeking access to dialysis, underscoring “the danger 
of making any order that the resources be used for a particular patient, 
which might have the eff ect of denying those resources to other patients 
to whom they might be more advantageously be devoted.” 8 Institutional 
competence aside, there are also separation of powers arguments 
against having courts second-guess decision-making by the legislative 
and executive branches. Elected bodies are democratically entrusted to 
reconcile the diverse interests at play with these polycentric tradeoff s, it is 
argued, making judicial forays into this area democratically illegitimate. 
Th ere are, of course, replies to these concerns that must be taken 
seriously. On the issue of resource allocation and polycentrism, courts 
have long interfered in defense of civil and political rights, though this 
too has signifi cant resource implications. 9  Moreover, outside of the 
rights context, courts adjudicate a host of other polycentric issues in law 
(e.g. competition law, anti-trust law and division of powers questions). 10 
Regarding concerns about the courts’ ability to regulate relationships 
prospectively, some have pointed to novel remedies available to courts, 
including suspended or delayed declarations of invalidity.11 On the issue 
of democratic legitimacy, some have argued that judicial review can in 
of Toronto Press, 2005) 184 at 186-88 (arguing against public interest 
standing on grounds that it allows abstract claims to proceed, lacking facts 
‘that add fl esh and bone to the case’). 
8. Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal [1998] 1 SA 765 at 776 
(S Afr Const Ct) [Soobramoney]. 
9. Kent Roach, “Th e Challenges of Crafting Remedies for Violations 
of Socio-economic Rights” in Malcolm Langford, ed, Social Rights 
Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 46 at 49 [Roach, 
“Crafting Remedies”]; Stephen Homes & Cass Sunstein, Th e Cost of 
Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (New York: WW Norton & Co, 
1999).
10. Jeff  King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012) at 198-99. 
11. Roach, “Crafting Remedies”, supra note 9.
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fact be democracy-enhancing – e.g. by targeting judicial scrutiny on 
government actions undertaken without robust and inclusive democratic 
deliberation.12 Together these replies off er a preliminary defense of judicial 
involvement in the protection of social rights, including rights to health 
care. Th e thornier challenge is to strike a proper institutional balance – 
delivering improved accountability in a manner that plays to the courts’ 
institutional strengths, while avoiding overreach into areas where the 
courts have little or no expertise to add, such as the determination of 
what new drugs and technologies should be funded.  
Courts themselves are often keen to avoid overreach, or even the 
perception of overreach, and this fundamentally shapes jurisprudence 
in the area of health care rights. An example commonly cited here is 
R v Cambridge Health Authority,13 a UK decision concerning a 10-year-
old girl, diagnosed with terminal leukemia, whose family launched an 
administrative law challenge in the hope of securing a further round 
of chemotherapy and a second bone marrow transplant – therapies the 
Cambridge Health Authority had refused on grounds of high cost and 
poor prognosis.  In rejecting the family’s claim, the Court of Appeal 
explained that, 
[d]iffi  cult and agonising judgments have to be made as to how a limited budget 
is best allocated to the maximum advantage of the maximum number of 
patients. Th at is not a judgment which the court can make.  In my judgment, 
it is not something that a health authority … can be fairly criticised for not 
advancing before the court.14
12. Alana Klein, “Section 7 of the Charter and the Principled Assignment of 
Legislative Jurisdiction” (2012) 57 Sup Ct L Rev 59; Martha Jackman, 
“Protecting Rights and Promoting Democracy: Judicial Review under s.1 
of the Charter” (1996) 34:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 661. See also Vriend et al 
v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493 (per Iacobucci J: “where the interests of a 
minority have been denied consideration, especially where that group has 
historically been the target of prejudice and discrimination, I believe that 
judicial intervention is warranted to correct a democratic process that has 
acted improperly” at para 176). 
13. R v Cambridge Health Authority, ex parte B (1995), 25 BMLR 5 (QB) 
[Cambridge Health Authority QB], rev’d [1995] 2 All ER 129 (CA) 
[Cambridge Health Authority CA].
14. Cambridge Health Authority CA, ibid at 137. In the Canadian context, 
see e.g. Chaoulli, supra note 5 at para 161 et seq (Binnie and Lebel JJ 
dissenting). In the South African context, see Soobramoney, supra note 8 at 
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Th is approach of categorical deference to the resource allocation 
decisions of health authorities lies at one extreme of judicial attitudes 
towards health care rights. Th ere is justifi able concern that it off ers 
insuffi  cient accountability, allowing health authorities to simply “toll the 
bell of tight resources,” as the lower court put it in Cambridge Health 
Authority.15 At the opposite extreme lies the approach taken in Brazil 
and other Latin American countries, where rights to health care have at 
times been interpreted as ‘trumps,’ with the judiciary showing little or 
no deference to overall resource allocations when ruling on individual 
claims. 16 Th is approach has its own pitfalls, foremost the risk of scarce 
health care resources being redistributed under the regressive principle of 
‘to each according to their ability to litigate.’ In the end, one hopes that 
courts will chart a path between deference and activism that advances 
the goals that inspire the right to health – namely ameliorating the stark 
inequalities that often exist in health care.
But as discussed in the next section, this path must be charted amidst 
various context-specifi c factors, which include the specifi c wording and 
method of enactments of health care rights (e.g. whether by ordinary 
statute or as part of a grand vision of transformative constitutionalism), 
the design and in-built accountability of a country’s health care system 
and the broader currents of social mobilization that inevitably infl uence 
the interpretation and enforcement of health care rights. As we will go 
on to argue, in Canada we have the luxury of a robust public health 
care system and thus we are not in the same need as Columbia, South 
Africa or India of challenging massive historical inequities.17 Th us in the 
Canadian context a reasonable solution may lie in the courts off ering a 
measure of accountability, particularly for vulnerable and marginalized 
769. 
15. Cambridge Health Authority QB, supra note 13 at 17.
16. Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, “Th e Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil: 
Worsening Inequities?” (2009) 11:2 Health & Hum Rts 33; Octavio 
Luiz Motta Ferraz, “Harming the Poor Th rough Social Rights Litigation: 
Lessons from Brazil” (2011) 89:7 Tex L Rev 1643 [Ferraz, “Lessons from 
Brazil”].
17. Th ere are of course serious and systemic health inequities in Canada, 
including gaping disparities in health outcomes among the country’s 
Aboriginal population. 
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populations, while also showing deference both to elected bodies and the 
expertise of health authorities. 
III. Health Care Rights in Context
Much of the research to date on the impact of health rights litigation 
adopts a comparative lens, contrasting the experiences of diverse countries 
in search of emerging patterns and workable typologies. 18 Comparative 
analysis of case law is an important component of this research, but when 
cases are taken out of context, they off er limited and potentially misleading 
guidance. For example, Canadian courts have been very conservative – at 
times arguably regressive – in Charter cases concerning access to health 
care (more on this below). But to what extent is this driven by non-
doctrinal factors, such as the design of Canada’s health system, its mix 
of public and private fi nancing, its administrative processes for rationing 
and so on? An understanding of these broader factors is essential to sound 
comparative analyses.19
Th ree contextual factors are discussed below: national aspirations 
underlying rights guarantees, the design and maturity of existing health 
systems, and levels of social mobilization around vital issues of health 
equity. Th ese factors are highlighted in part because they are germane to 
Canada’s experience with health care litigation. A host of other contextual 
factors – such as extreme resource limitations, bribery and corruption 
18. Th is paper, particularly in Parts I and IV, draws upon fi ndings of Colleen 
Flood & Aeyal Gross, eds, Th e Right to Health at the Public/Private 
Divide: A Global Comparative Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014). Other recent comparative studies on health rights litigation 
include: Alicia Ely Yamin & Siri Gloppen, eds, Litigating Health Rights: 
Can Courts Bring More Justice to Health? (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2011); Varun Gauri & Daniel M Brinks, eds, Courting 
Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the 
Developed World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Jung, 
Hirschl & Rosevear, supra note 2; Katharine G Young & Julieta Lemaitre, 
“Th e Comparative Fortunes of the Right to Health: Two Tales of 
Justiciability in Colombia and South Africa” (2013) 26:1 Harv Hum Rts J 
179.  
19. Ted Marmor, Richard Freeman & Kieke Okma, “Comparative 
Perspectives and Policy Learning in the World of Health Care” (2005) 7:4 
Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 331. 
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within health systems and lack of judicial independence – shape the 
impact of health litigation in other countries, but have less relevance in 
comparison to Canada.20 
A.  Health Rights and Broader Constitutional   
 Aspirations 
Th ough fundamental rights are often conceived as ‘universal,’ the purpose 
and aspirations underlying rights guarantees vary considerably, refl ecting 
a country’s history, its experiences with colonialism, racial or ethnic 
divisions, its stage of economic development and so on. Courts may 
be emboldened or inhibited by these factors in their defense of health 
rights. Th us, for example, South Africa’s post-Apartheid constitution 
recognizes a right to health care, along with other ‘second generation’ 
rights, under a general theory of ‘transformative constitutionalism,’ 
which aims at rectifying deep and longstanding injustices through a 
process guided by the rule of law.21 Th ese transformative aspirations are 
refl ected in the unequivocal language of South Africa’s constitutional 
guarantees regarding health, which states that “[e]veryone has the right 
to have access to ... health care services, including reproductive health 
care,” and mandates that “[t]he state must take reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realization of these rights.”22 Emboldened by this language, the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa addressed the legitimacy of judicial 
20. On judicial independence and health rights, see Oscar Cabrera & Fanny 
Gomez, “Litigating the Right to Health in Venezuela: A Non-Justiciable 
Right in the Context of a Defi cient Health Care System” in Flood & 
Gross, supra note 18 at 394; on the impact of bribery and corruption, 
see Eva Foldes, “Addressing Equity in Health Care at Th e Public-Private 
Intersection: Th e Role of Health Rights Enforcement in Hungary” in 
Flood & Gross, supra note 18 at 208; on health rights under extreme 
resource scarcity, see Remigius N Nwabueze, “Th e Legal Protection and 
Enforcement of Health Rights in Nigeria” in Flood & Gross, supra note 
18 at 371.
21. Karl Klare, “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 
14:1 SAJHR 146; Eric Christiansen, “Transformative Constitutionalism 
in South Africa: Creative Uses of Constitutional Court Authority to 
Advance Substantive Justice” (2010) 13:3 J Gender Race & Just 575. 
22. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, No 108 of 1996, s 27. 
58 
 
Th omas & Flood, Putting Health to Rights
review unequivocally in its Treatment Action Campaign ruling: “[i]n so 
far as [the adjudication of health care rights] constitutes an intrusion 
into the domain of the Executive, that is an intrusion mandated by the 
Constitution itself.” 23  
By contrast, inasmuch as Canadian courts have recognized health-
related rights, these have been derived from the Charter’s open-ended 
guarantees, notably the section 7 protections against unjust infringements 
of “life, liberty and security of the person” and the section 15 “right to 
the equal protection and equal benefi t of the law without discrimination 
…”24 Th ere is debate, even among progressive legal scholars, as to how 
far Canadian courts should venture in the direction of recognizing social 
rights, under this ambiguous constitutional mandate. Some encourage 
a more rigorous judicial review on questions of access to health care, 25 
while others caution that “attempts to leverage a comprehensive protection 
of social rights out of an instrument that is chiefl y aimed at protecting a 
class of civil and political rights is not only undesirable, but irresponsible 
and undemocratic.”26 Perhaps this ambiguous constitutional mandate 
partly explains the courts’ restrained approach to date: a 2008 comparative 
study by the International Commission of Jurists, looking at cross-
country variations in the adjudication of economic, social, and cultural 
rights, reveals that Canadian courts have been exceptionally conservative 
in their approach27 – recognizing positive rights to health care in only one 
23. Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others, 
[2002] ZACC 15 at para 99 [TAC]. 
24. Some have long maintained that s 7 is meant only to govern the 
individual’s “interaction with the justice system and its administration.” 
See New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G (J), 
[1999] 3 SCR 46 at para 65. 
25. Martha Jackman, “Charter Review as a Health Care Accountability 
Mechanism in Canada” (2010) 18 Health LJ 1 [Jackman, “Charter 
Review”]; Bruce Porter, “A Right to Health Care in Canada: Only If You 
Can Pay For It” (2005) 6:4 ESR Review: Economic and Social Rights in 
South Africa 8. 
26. King, supra note 10 at 200 [emphasis in the original]. 
27. International Commission of Jurists, Courts and the Legal Enforcement 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Comparative experiences of 
justiciability (Geneva: ICJ, 2008). 
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notable ruling. 28 
Th is is not to suggest that a broader recognition of health care rights 
would run contrary to Canada’s constitutional values or its aspirations 
as a nation. Certainly the plain wording of the Charter does not bind 
Canadian courts to a conservative interpretation of health care rights. 
Th e wording of article 21 of India’s Constitution29 is nearly identical to 
section 7 of the Charter, and yet the Indian Supreme Court has been 
more active in championing health rights (and economic, cultural 
and social rights generally).30  Moreover, Canada long ago ratifi ed the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which 
includes a “right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health.”31 Courts in other countries, 
such as Israel and the Netherlands, have been swayed in their reading 
of domestic health rights by their countries’ ratifi cation of the right to 
health under international law.32 In interpreting this right, international 
law has roundly rejected the negative/positive rights distinction to which, 
as explained below, Canadian courts continue to cling.33 
On the one hand, lower and middle income countries have led the 
world in embracing these rights – which is understandable, given there is 
often an urgent and widespread need for improved access to basic care in 
these countries and to correct an often appalling imbalance of resources 
devoted to the private as opposed to public system. Yet the very scale of 
28. Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 SCR 624 
[Eldridge].
29. “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except 
according to procedure established by law.” Th e Constitution of India, 
1949, as amended by Th e Constitution (One Hundred and Twentieth 
Amendment) Bill, 2013, art 21. 
30. Jung, Hirschl & Rosevear, supra note 2. 
31. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 
December 1966, 993 UNTS 3.  Canada ratifi ed the ECSR in 1976.  
32. Aeyal Gross, “Th e Right to Health in Israel between Solidarity and 
Neoliberalism” in Flood & Gross, supra note 18 at 159; Andre den Exter, 
“Health Access in the Netherlands” in Flood & Gross, supra note 18 at 
188.
33. UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), General Comment No. 9: Th e domestic application of the 
Covenant, 3 December 1998, E/C 12/1998/24.
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unmet needs in these countries may present a problem that is beyond 
the power of courts to address. Th us, in making the case that health 
care litigation in Brazil has led to siphoning of resources by wealthier 
Brazilians, health law scholar Octavio Ferraz rejects the proposition that 
more litigation by the poor off ers a solution:
[E]ven if poor people had eff ective access to the courts and started to litigate en 
masse … and even if courts were as receptive to their claims as they are to those 
of middle class right-to-health litigants … their mandatory injunctions would 
soon face a brick wall due to lack of political will and normative consensus on 
radical egalitarian measures. No court, however willing, would have the power 
to overcome that obstacle.34
As we write, however, Columbian courts are charting a very bold course 
and aim to directly impact health policy through a series of recent rulings 
that are issuing directions to the government on how to reform health 
care policy. Arguably these kind of court-induced systemic reforms will 
benefi t all Columbians, including the poor. In the Canadian context, 
such reforms would challenge entrenched concepts of parliamentary 
sovereignty and conceptions of judicial deference and, in our view, are 
unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future.  
B.  Health Rights, Judicial Deference, and the Public/ 
 Private Divide
Th e trajectory of health care rights litigation is also shaped, in fundamental 
ways, by the basic design of a country’s health system – notably its reliance 
on private versus public fi nancing and administration. For example, in 
countries that have adopted a managed competition model whereby 
universal access is achieved through heavy regulation of private for-health 
insurers, such as Colombia, there is a greater potential for litigation on 
the part of patients against such insurers. Under a managed competition 
scheme, laws and regulations stipulate a basic basket of coverage; but 
where insurers fail to meet these requirements, this results in confl icts 
with patients that may ultimately be litigated under the right to health. 
In Colombia, this basic dynamic has in the past contributed to a tsunami 
of health rights litigation, thanks in part to a low-cost and expeditious 
34. Ferraz, “Lessons from Brazil”, supra note 16 at 1667. 
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system of adjudication (so-called tutela hearings).35  
Th is expanded role for private for-profi t insurers changes the basic 
complexion of health rights litigation, particularly vis-à-vis the worries 
about polycentrism and democratic legitimacy discussed above. In the 
Colombian context, courts may reason that the refusal of treatments by 
private insurers is motivated by profi t, and less a refl ection of polycentric 
tradeoff  between the interests of all patients. Likewise, there is obviously 
little concern over the democratic legitimacy of judicial review of 
rationing decisions by private insurers. In some instances, Colombian 
courts have scrutinized the government-mandated basket of services, 
which has predictably been far more controversial, inviting accusations 
of ‘government by judges.’36
Contrast this with Canada, where the Canada Health Act37 
stipulates that the fi nancing of medically necessary care must be publicly 
administered.  Given the driving concern about overreach, it is perhaps 
to be expected that Canadian courts would take a deferential approach 
under these circumstances, and indeed a degree of reticence is seen across 
other industrialized countries with (relatively) well-functioning tax-
fi nanced health systems.38 In theory at least, when a Canadian patient is 
denied needed care, a government or a governmental agency has made 
the decision with a public interest mandate vision. As well, a far more 
expansive range of tradeoff s are at play as courts second guess resource 
allocation within a tax-fi nanced system; resources redirected to health 
care may have to be drawn from a pool that supplies funding for many 
other vital government services. Finally, whereas Colombia’s tutela rulings 
typically impacted only the parties involved (although the sheer volume 
of claims ultimately had a systemic eff ect), judicial precedents related 
to publicly administered health systems will in theory have a broad and 
lasting impact – given that “[t]he nature of modern government means 
that justice for an individual will often require systemic measures that 
35. Everaldo Lamprea, “Colombia’s Right-to-health Litigation in a Context of 
Health Care Reform” in Flood & Gross, supra note 18 at 131; Young & 
Lemaitre, supra note 18.
36. Young & Lemaitre, ibid at 189.
37. RSC 1985, c C-6 [CHA]
38. See generally Flood & Gross, supra note 18.
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will deliver justice to much larger groups.”39 
Such contextual factors may partly explain Canadian courts’ reluctant 
and conservative approach to the recognition of health care rights, 
particularly by comparison to the hyper-individualized approach taken 
in some Latin American countries. Surface appearances can be somewhat 
misleading though: under tax-fi nanced universal health systems, judicial 
approaches which on their face seem cautious and deferential –  e.g. courts 
recognizing only negative rights in health care – can potentially have 
very disruptive eff ects. Th e Supreme Court of Canada’s much-criticized 
Chaoulli decision, discussed later, is a case in point. 
C.  Health Rights and Social Mobilization
It is widely recognized that broader social movements are often 
instrumental in the success or failure of health rights at every stage, from 
the launching of claims, through the litigation process, and in pressuring 
governments to honour their obligations in the wake of a successful 
court challenge.40 Civil society groups can shape the outcome of health 
rights litigation in various ways, whether by promoting public awareness 
around an issue, lobbying governments to fi nance treatments or close 
access barriers, funding test litigation, participating in litigation as third 
party interveners and, in the event of a courtroom success, monitoring 
and reporting on government compliance with court orders.  
Th e importance of social mobilization to success in the litigation 
of health rights is commonly illustrated with the example of HIV/
AIDS activism, and the South African Constitutional Court’s (CCSA) 
decision in Treatment Action Campaign41 – arguably one of the world’s 
most discussed and celebrated health rights decisions to date.  42 In TAC, 
39. Roach, “Crafting Remedies”, supra note 9 at 49. But note discussion 
below of the less-than-systematic implementation of the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s Charter ruling requiring provision of interpretive services for 
deaf patients as they seek medically necessary care. 
40. Siri Gloppen, “Litigation as a Strategy to Hold Governments Accountable 
for Implementing the Right to Health” (2008) 10:2 Health & Hum 
Rts 21. 
41. TAC, supra note 23.
42. Lisa Forman & Jerome Amir Singh, “Th e Role of Rights and Litigation in 
Assuring More Equitable Access to Health Care in South Africa” in Flood 
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the CCSA interpreted the right to health care as requiring the South 
African government to expand access to a drug (nevirapine) used in 
preventing mother-to-child transmission of HIV. Prior to the litigation, 
activists had successfully lobbied the manufacturer to provide the drug 
free of charge, but the South African government nevertheless restricted 
its availability to certain test sites, citing inter alia safety concerns and the 
cost of complementary services (e.g. counseling services, formula milk). In 
rejecting these government justifi cations, the CCSA cited evidence that 
political pressures had already led to expanded provision of nevirapine in 
some regions, demonstrating that “provided the requisite political will 
is present, the supply of nevirapine at public health institutions can be 
rapidly expanded …”43 Moreover, the Court explained, the government’s 
recent infusion of nearly a billion rand in new funding for HIV treatment 
indicated that, “budgetary constraints … are no longer an impediment.”44 
Social mobilization was instrumental to the TAC’s success story 
within the courtroom and beyond. Th us, for example, by building 
treatment literacy and pressuring drug makers to provide nevirapine 
at no cost, activists undermined government’s argument from resource 
constraints; by lobbying successfully for expanded delivery programs in 
some regions, activists demonstrated that the barriers to national rollout 
were political, and not resource-related; and social mobilization triggered 
the government’s decision to pre-emptively expand budgets for HIV 
treatments while the case was before the courts, further undermining the 
argument from resource constraints.   
A comparison between TAC and Grootboom and Others v Oostenberg 
and Others 45 – another famous South African case related to housing 
rights – reveals how courtroom victories may ring hollow on the ground, 
& Gross, supra note 18 at 288; Young & Lemaitre, supra note 18 at 215; 
Mark Heywood, “South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign: Combining 
Law and Social Mobilization to Realize the Right to Health” (2000) 1:1 
Journal of Human Rights Practice 14; Leslie London, “What is a Human-
Rights Based Approach to Health and Does it Matter?” (2008) 10:1 
Health & Hum Rts 65.  
43. TAC, supra note 23 at para 119. 
44. Ibid at para 120.
45. [2000] ZACC 19 [Grootboom].
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absent eff ective and persistent social mobilization.46 Eight years after her 
precedent-setting victory under the South African Constitution’s right to 
housing, Irene Grootboom died in middle age, homeless and destitute.47 
Summing up the decision’s ultimate impact, one commentator explains 
that, “no major shifts in housing policy have followed this test case, 
largely because of the lack of civil society pressure or a social movement 
in the area of housing.”48  
Much the same diffi  culty has arisen where Canadian courts have 
recognized positive rights with respect to health care. In Eldridge,49 the 
Supreme Court of Canada ruled that government’s failure to provide 
interpretive services for deaf patients was an infringement of equality 
rights under section 15 of the Charter. Th ough disability activists greeted 
the decision as a major victory, implementation has been disappointing: 
to date British Columbia and Ontario have been the only provinces to 
comply with the ruling. Even in these provinces, medical interpretive 
services have been plagued by problems of underfunding and interpreter 
shortages. 50 
Often, when this connection is drawn between social mobilization 
and the realization of health rights, a tactical lesson is drawn: activists 
seeking access to a given therapy through court challenges are advised to 
take a multi-pronged approach, building sustainable political momentum 
around their cause. Stepping back from that tactical advice, a bigger 
46. Forman & Singh, supra note 42. 
47. Grootboom, supra note 45; Pearlie Joubert “Grootboom dies homeless 
and penniless”, Mail & Guardian (28 August 2008), online: Mail and 
Guardian <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-08-08-grootboom-dies-
homeless-and-penniless>.  
48. London, supra note 42 at 67.  
49. Eldridge, supra note 28.
50. Colleen M Flood & YY Brandon Chen, “Charter of Rights & Health 
Care Funding: A Typology of Canadian Health Rights Litigation” (2010) 
19:3 Annals Health L 479 at 489-94 and 509-18. Th e interplay between 
litigation and social mobilization is a two-way street. In some instances, 
headline-making cases draw public attention to an issue, potentially 
shifting public opinion and spurring change through political channels. 
Th is dynamic has been observed in Canada as well, as the Supreme 
Court’s rulings on physician assisted suicide, IVF funding, and access to 
autism therapies have coincided with changing public attitudes on these 
issues. 
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picture question is whether – given its dependence on social mobilization 
– a rights-based approach to health care will tend to advance equity 
overall.
Eff ectiveness at social mobilization is, after all, partly a function of a 
constituency’s resources and political infl uence, raising the concern that 
health rights, insofar as their exercise requires societal backing, may tend 
to benefi t comparatively advantaged groups.51 Some prominent critics 
of health rights have argued, for example, that groundbreaking progress 
around HIV/AIDS was due partly to that disease’s impact on middle 
and upper classes. Th ey point to the fact that global spending on HIV/
AIDS has vastly eclipsed spending on other diseases that more narrowly 
target the poor, killing in comparable numbers, such as malaria and 
tuberculosis.52      
Of course, concerns about health care resources fl owing on the basis 
of ‘ability to mobilize’ can arise even without the courts’ involvement. 
For example, in New Zealand’s drawn-out debate over public funding 
for the breast cancer drug Herceptin, the courts sided with the country’s 
Pharmaceutical Management Agency (PHARMAC), ruling that the 
latter’s decision to limit funding for the drug to a nine-week regimen 
was reasonable, and rejecting the claimant’s demand for a twelve-month 
regimen.53 Following that ruling, however, a new government came 
to power, and delivered on its election promise to extend funding for 
Herceptin to twelve months, overriding PHARMAC’s decision that this 
could not be justifi ed under the country’s guidelines for rationing.54   
A related concern is that public attention and social mobilization is 
often stirred by a ‘rescue imperative’ – focusing on discrete health issues for 
which eff ective therapies are available. With the development of eff ective 
51. Ibid at 71.  
52. Roger England, “Th e Dangers of Disease Specifi c Programmes for 
Developing Countries” (2007) 335:7619 Brit Med J 565; William 
Easterly, “Human Rights are the Wrong Basis for Health Care”, Wall 
Street Journal (12 October 2009). See generally Julia H Smith & Alan 
Whiteside, “Th e History of AIDS Exceptionalism” (2010) 13:47 Journal 
of the International AIDS Society 1. 
53. Walsh v Pharmaceutical Management Agency, [2008] NZHC 44.
54. Joanna Manning, “Litigating a Right to Health Care in New Zealand” in 
Flood & Gross, supra note 18 at 19. 
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anti-retroviral medicines, the HIV/AIDS epidemic came to fi t this 
description and became a candidate for eff ective social mobilization and 
judicial intervention in the South African context. It is not clear that the 
most pressing health inequities in the Canadian context fi t this framing. 
For example, the appalling disparity in health outcomes experienced by 
Canada’s Aboriginal population, or the country’s growing epidemic of 
non-communicable diseases, will not be addressed by expanding access 
to particular pharmaceuticals. Will the public rally around a rights-based 
framing of these complex multi-factorial challenges? Are the courts in 
any position to devise and enforce eff ective remedies?  
IV.  Health Care Rights in the Canadian Context
To this point we have seen the central dilemma facing courts in 
adjudicating health rights (i.e. a concern about overreach), and discussed 
various contextual factors that further shape the prospects for health 
rights litigation – including factors that partly explain Canadian courts’ 
deferential approach to date. Of course, deference can take many forms, 
and so a further question is whether Canadian courts, in addressing 
claims concerning the right to health care, have drawn lines of deference 
in the right places. To explore that question, we provide an overview 
of health litigation under the Charter, specifi cally under sections 7 and 
15. 55  It will be argued that in drawing these lines, Canadian courts 
have favoured formalism over substantive fairness: broadly speaking, a 
hard line has been drawn, interpreting the section 7 right to life and 
security of the person as a ‘negative’ right, while the section 15 equality 
right has been read as guaranteeing only ‘access to the basket’ of care 
committed to statutorily by provincial insurers. One can acknowledge 
that the Canadian context calls for a degree of judicial deference while 
questioning the wisdom of this path.  Courts in other similarly situated 
countries, such as the UK, have had success at holding governments 
55. Canadians have other options for litigating issues of access to health 
care (e.g. administrative law review). For a brief overview of the options 
available to patients refused care in Ontario, see Colleen M Flood, 
Carolyn Tuohy & Mark Stabile, “What Is In and Out of Medicare? Who 
Decides?” in Colleen M Flood, ed, Just Medicare: What’s In, What’s Out, 
How We Decide (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) 15 at 17-30. 
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accountable for reasonable decision-making in health care.  
A.  Focus on ‘Negative’ Rights 
In the Canadian context, judicial oversight of health care resource 
allocation has been avoided in part by construing the Charter’s section 
7 guarantee of ‘life, liberty and security of the person’ as protecting 
only negative rights. In most cases where Canadian claimants have 
secured health care related victories through litigation, the prize has 
been a negative right – for example, overturning restrictions on access 
to abortion services, safe injection sites and medical marijuana.  56 Th is 
approach can perhaps be defended as a plain reading of the Canadian 
Charter, which as explained, diff ers from other modern bills of rights in 
its focus on standard civil and political rights to the exclusion of explicit 
social and economic rights. At times the Supreme Court of Canada 
has stated explicitly that the Charter grants no positive right to health 
care, as in this passage from its unanimous 2004 ruling, Auton v British 
Columbia: “[t]his Court has repeatedly held that the legislature is under 
no obligation to create a particular benefi t.” 57 
As many commentators have noted, recognition of a negative right 
to a particular therapy does little to advance equitable access. Evidence 
suggests, for example, that access issues worsened in the years following 
the Morgentaler decision, as the number of hospitals off ering abortion 
56. R v Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30 (access to abortion) [Morgentaler]; 
Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 
SCC 44 (safe injection sites) [PHS]; R v Parker (2000), 49 OR (3d) 481 
(CA) (medical marijuana). See Flood & Chen, supra note 50 at 494. 
Th ere have also been a handful of Charter challenges to criminal laws 
impacting health rights, but which do not implicate access to health care 
per se: Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 (challenging 
prostitution laws as an infringement of security of the person); R v 
Mabior, 2012 SCC 47 (challenging criminal law provisions requiring 
disclosure of HIV status).  
57. Auton (Guardian ad litem of ) v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2004 
SCC 78 at para 41 [Auton]. See also Chief Justice McLachlin’s comment 
in Chaoulli, supra note 5 at para 104 that the Charter “does not confer a 
free standing constitutional right to health care.” In other contexts, the 
Court has expressed an openness in principle to recognizing positive rights 
under s 7. See Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84. 
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services declined, forcing many women to incur out-of-pocket expenses 
traveling to receive the service out of province, or in private clinics.58 In 
countries such as Canada, where citizens rely largely on the state for the 
fi nancing and governance of health systems, overturning state-imposed 
obstacles can at best be a fi rst step towards ensuring equitable access.    
A deeper concern relates to the insidious eff ect that negative rights 
may have when used to challenge laws that promote overall equity. 
Th e Supreme Court long ago acknowledged this risk, with Chief 
Justice Dickson famously writing in an early Charter ruling that, “[i]n 
interpreting and applying the Charter … the courts must be cautious to 
ensure that it does not simply become an instrument of better situated 
individuals to roll back legislation which has as its object the improvement 
of the condition of less advantaged persons.”59 Yet this cautionary note 
was seemingly thrown to the wind with the 2005 decision, Chaoulli v 
Quebec.60 Th ere, the co-plaintiff s alleged that, given wait times in the 
public system, Quebec’s ban on private insurance breached patients’ 
rights to life and security of the person, under both section 1 of Quebec’s 
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms61 and section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter.  In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners 
and repudiated the prohibition of private insurance on the basis of 
the Quebec Charter. In their reasoning, the majority relied upon on a 
crude international comparison of health systems to conclude that the 
allowance of a parallel private sector would not necessarily undermine 
the quality of the public health care regime.62 Th ree of the four majority 
judges in Chaoulli also found the legislative prohibition in question to 
have infringed section 7 of the Charter.  
Many were surprised at the Court’s willingness to wade into the 
complex policy issues raised in Chaoulli, particularly in light of the 
58. See Flood & Chen, supra note 50; Sanda Rodgers, “Abortion Denied: 
Bearing the Limits of Law” in Flood, supra note 55 at 107.
59. R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd, [1986] 2 SCR 713 at para 136.
60. Chaoulli, supra note 5.
61. RSQ c C-12, (“[e]very human being has a right to life, and to personal 
security, inviolability and freedom,” s 1). 
62. See Colleen M Flood, “Chaoulli: Political Undertows and Judicial 
Riptides” (2008) Health LJ at 211 (for a thorough discussion on the fl aws 
of the Supreme Court’s international comparative exercise).
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deference shown in earlier rulings in this area. 63 Kent Roach has suggested 
that what distinguished the Chaoulli claim, from the Court’s perspective, 
was precisely the negative remedy sought:
Th e simplicity of the remedy requested by the Charter applicants made 
their substantive claims attractive to the majority … Th e applicants in this 
case asked for a simple, traditional and easy to enforce remedy.  Th ey did not 
ask the courts to declare that governments had to provide new health care 
services … let alone retain jurisdiction to ensure systemic compliance with the 
Charter …64
Th is brings us back, in essence, to the basic dilemma concerning the courts’ 
institutional competence, discussed in Part I above. It is easier for courts 
to strike down law and policy than to oversee its implementation, which 
does not bode well for the prospects of health rights litigation addressing 
the needs of disadvantaged groups who depend on government services. 
As it happens, Chaoulli was the fi rst battle in a larger war to create 
opportunities for more private fi nancing of medically necessary care and 
similar litigation is now occurring across Canada. In Alberta, claimant 
William Murray is currently pursuing a class action against the province 
for damages he allegedly sustained from the denial of access to a hip 
replacement procedure under the public health insurance plan. He argues 
that the denial of public coverage, in conjunction with sections of the 
Alberta Health Care Insurance Act65 that prevent treatment access outside 
of the government-run regime, violates his rights under section 7 of the 
Charter.66 An ongoing case initiated by claimants Lindsay McCreith and 
Ms. Shona Holmes points to wait time problems in Ontario, and calls 
into question the constitutionality of provincial regulations designed to 
suppress the expansion of the private health care sector.67 A private for-
profi t clinic, Cambie Surgeries Corporation (Cambie), is contesting the 
constitutionality of similar provisions under British Columbia’s Medicare 
63. Sujit Choudhry, “Worse than Lochner?” in Flood, Roach & Sossin, supra 
note 7 at 76.
64. Roach, supra note 7 at 184.
65. RSA 2000, c A-20.
66. Murray v Alberta (Minister of Health), 2007 ABQB 231 at paras 21-22. 
67. McCreith v Ontario (Attorney General) (5 September 2007), No 07-CU-
339454PD3 (Ont Sup Ct) Statement of Claim.
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Protection Act.68 Cambie is represented by Dr. Brian Day, a past president 
of the Canadian Medical Association (CMA).69  
Of late, some more hopeful prospects have emerged in section 7 
jurisprudence. In the recent case Canada v PHS Community Services,70 
the issue was whether section 7 was engaged by the federal Minister of 
Health’s withdrawal of an exemption, which had previously allowed the 
Insite safe injection facility to operate without fear of criminal prosecution 
under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.71 Th ere the majority 
found that rights to life, liberty and security of the person were engaged 
by the Minister’s decision – forcing as it would the clinic’s clientele to 
dangerous back-alley injection practices.72 Continuing with its section 7 
analysis, the Court then explored whether the Ministerial decision had 
been made “in accordance with principles of fundamental justice,” citing 
evidence of the clinic’s success in saving lives to conclude that withdrawal 
of the exemption was arbitrary and grossly disproportionate.73 Strictly 
speaking, the claimants in PHS secured a negative right, but the decision 
signals a new willingness on the part of the Court to probe the evidence 
supporting government decisions to withdraw access to health services. 
Might this precedent carry over to cases where governments attempt to 
withdraw funding for health care programs?  
Th e question may receive an answer in litigation currently underway 
at the Federal Court, challenging the federal government’s recent decision 
68. RSBC 1996, c 286.
69. Cambie Surgeries Corp v British Columbia (Medical Services Commission), 
2010 BCCA 396. Th is case is part of an early round of this constitutional 
battle concerning the ability of the Medical Service Commission to audit 
Dr. Day’s clinic. Th e audit sampled 468 services provided by two private 
clinics (Cambie and Specialist Referral Clinic) and found that almost 
half were illegally billed. See Ministry of Health, Audit & Investigations 
Branch, Specialist Referral Clinic (Vancouver) Inc and Cambie Surgeries 
Corporation Audit Report (Vancouver: Ministry of Health, Audit and 
Investigations Branch, 2012), online: BC Ministry of Health <http://
www.health.gov.bc.ca/msp/legislation/pdf/srccsc-audit-report-2012.pdf>.
70. PHS, supra note 56.
71. SC 1996, c 19.
72. PHS, supra note 56 at para 93.
73. Ibid at paras 129-33. 
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to claw back the long-standing Interim Federal Health Plan.74 Under the 
new rules, health care coverage for certain categories of refugee claimants 
is limited to ‘urgent and essential’ care, while others will receive coverage 
only if their health status poses a threat to public health. Th e claimants 
argue, inter alia, that the withdrawal of coverage endangers the aff ected 
refugees’ section 7 interests – most cannot aff ord private insurance, and 
so run the risk of being denied life-saving treatment. Th e claimants 
acknowledge that the Charter does not confer a positive right to health 
care, but cite PHS to argue that government decisions withdrawing 
access to care must accord with principles of fundamental justice (i.e. 
avoid arbitrariness and gross disproportionality).75 
B.  Equality of  ‘Access to the Basket’
Claimants have used the Charter’s section 15 guarantee of “equal benefi t 
of the law without discrimination” to press for access to health goods and 
services denied under provincial insurance plans. Section 15 does not 
aim to prevent unequal benefi ts per se, as governments inevitably draw 
distinctions in the provision of services.76 Th e equality guarantee bars 
only wrongful forms of discrimination, which deprive individuals of the 
benefi ts of the law on the basis of “race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental and physical disability,” along with analogous 
grounds such as sexual orientation. Canadian courts have disavowed 
a formalistic approach to the equality guarantee, instead requiring 
governments to “take into account the underlying diff erences between 
individuals in society,”77 adjusting laws to achieve substantive equality.  
74. Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v Attorney General or Canada (Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration) (30 October 2013), T-356-13 (FC) 
(Memorandum of Fact and Law of the Applicants) online: Justice for 
Children and Youth <http://www.jfcy.org/PDFs/IFHP_Memo_CDRC_
CARL.pdf>.
75. Rather than breaking new ground under s 7, the court may opt to decide 
this case under s 15, as the new regime discriminates against refugees on 
the basis of their country of origin. 
76. “It must be recognized … that every diff erence in treatment between 
individuals under the law will not necessarily result in inequality …”: 
Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at 164.
77. Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 
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While the equality guarantee does not ground a positive right to 
health care, it may oblige governments to take positive steps to ensure that 
citizens enjoy equal benefi t of established health systems. Th e singular 
instance where Canadian courts have recognized a positive obligation on 
the part of governments to provide health-related services arose under 
the rubric of equality rights. In Eldridge v British Columbia, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the government’s non-funding of sign language 
interpretation services at public hospitals violated the equality rights of 
the province’s deaf population.78 At the time, many had hoped that the 
Court’s unanimous ruling in Eldridge might open the door to increased 
judicial scrutiny of issues of health care accessibility. In the years that 
followed, claimants drew on the precedent to argue that non-funding of 
autism therapies79 and in vitro fertilization80 also infringed the right to 
equality.  
From the outcome of these later decisions, though, it appears that 
the Eldridge precedent applies narrowly, guaranteeing only equal ‘access 
to the basket’ of health care services deemed ‘medically necessary’ by 
government decision-makers. Nola Ries explains the limiting principle 
at play here: “the Eldridge claim is like a wheelchair user asking a library 
to build a ramp so she may gain access to the books in the library that 
are available to patrons who can walk up the stairs. In contrast, Eldridge 
is not like the disabled patron asking the library to purchase new books 
to put on the shelves.” 81   
Th e access to the basket principle was deployed in Auton, as the 
Supreme Court ruled unanimously that non-funding of ABA/IBI autism 
therapies did not infringe the petitioner’s section 15 equality rights. 
497 at para 25.
78. Supra note 28. See also Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 
SCC 61 (drawing on the Eldridge precedent to fi nd that the closure 
of a Diagnostic Centre for students with learning disabilities created a 
discriminatory barrier to public schooling, under the BC Human Rights 
Code). 
79. Auton, supra note 57. 
80. Cameron v Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (1999), 204 NSR (2d) 1.  
81. Nola M Ries, “Charter Challenges” in Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfi eld 
& Colleen M Flood, eds, Canadian Health Law and Policy (Markham: 
LexisNexis Canada, 2011) 615 at 628-29. 
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Th ere, the Court explained that neither the Canada Health Act,82 nor the 
relevant British Columbia legislation,83 promised funding for ‘non-core’ 
services. Legislation instead left it to the discretion of the province’s 
Medical Services Commission to designate particular practitioners and 
procedures for non-core funding, and ABA/IBI therapy had not been 
so designated. Th us Chief Justice McLachlin diff erentiated Auton from 
Eldridge by noting that, “Eldridge … was concerned with unequal access 
to a benefi t that the law conferred and with applying a benefi t granting 
law in a non-discriminatory fashion. By contrast, [Auton] is concerned 
with access to a benefi t that the law has not conferred.”84  
In eff ect, the ‘access to the basket’ principle does for section 15 what 
the ‘negative rights’ reading does for section 7, carving down the right’s 
scope to align with the basic premise that “… the legislature is under 
no obligation to create a particular benefi t.”85 Ultimately, of course, this 
traces back to the concern about overreach; as Sujit Choudhry puts it, 
[t]his reasoning is so diffi  cult to defend that the only way to read Auton [is] as 
having created a political questions doctrine around the scope of the Medicare 
envelope.  Th e clear message from the Court was that the Court did not wish 
judges to be drawn into adjudicating upon the design of Medicare on a case-
by-case basis, a task for which they are poorly qualifi ed.86 
A basic concern here is that the ‘access to the basket’ principle off ers 
questionable guidance for achieving substantive equality. Consider even 
the conclusion reached in the library analogy, namely, that equality is 
achieved provided that disabled people have physical access to the 
collection. Surely, though, a commitment to substantive equality must 
have some bearing on a library’s basket of off erings – e.g. the availability of 
82. Supra note 36.
83. Medicare Protection Act, RSBC 1996, c 286.
84. Auton, supra note 57 at para 38 [emphasis in the original]. 
85. Ibid at para 41. Th ere are other elements to s 15, including the 
requirement that claimants articulate an appropriate comparator group, 
and show harm to dignity. We sidestep these issues for two reasons: (1) 
Th e ‘access to the basket’ principle arises at an earlier stage in the court’s 
analysis, meaning that these other criteria will seldom be determinative 
in s 15 claims involving Medicare rationing; (2) Th ese later stages of s 
15 analysis have been overhauled in recent decisions. See R v Kapp, 2008 
SCC 41 and Withler v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 12. 
86. Choudhry, supra note 63 at 93.
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books written in braille. Th e reality is that many of the gravest threats to 
equity in Canadian health care stem precisely from decisions about what 
to include in the basket. Canada currently has roughly a 70:30 mix of 
public to private funding for health care, behind most comparable OECD 
countries. 87 Th at outsized component of privatized care covers many 
indispensible elements of modern health care, including prescription 
drugs, dental care, and long-term care.88 Th eir exclusion from the public 
basket does not necessarily refl ect careful and transparent deliberation 
over relevant tradeoff s. For example, the omission of prescription drug 
and long-term care coverage is largely a vestige of Canadian Medicare’s 
1960s origins – a time when drugs accounted for a much smaller 
portion of health care spending, and health care was largely provided by 
physicians and/or in hospitals. Technological advancements and an aging 
population have meant that those excluded components have grown as a 
percentage of overall health spending, resulting in passive privatization. 
Meanwhile, year-to-year decisions over what physician services are 
included under provincial plans appear to be largely the byproduct of 
annual fee negotiations between provinces and their respective provincial 
medical associations – a process biased towards preserving the status quo, 
and liable to be infl uenced by non-medical considerations.89 In short, 
the ‘access to the basket’ principle arguably insulates serious and systemic 
inequalities from rights scrutiny, in formalistic deference to legislative 
decision-making, which appears variously complacent, opaque and non-
evidence-based. 
87. William Lahey, “Medicare and the Law: Contours of an Evolving 
Relationship” in Downie, Caulfi eld & Flood, supra note 81 at 6.   
88. Although not required to do so under the Canada Health Act, provinces 
do provide coverage for prescription drugs, home care, etc. however 
coverage varies signifi cantly from province to province. See Virginie 
Demers et al, “Comparison of provincial prescription drug plans and the 
impact on patients’ annual drug expenditures” (2008) 178:4 Can Med 
Assoc J 405; Vishnu Kapur & Kisalaya Basu, “Drug coverage in Canada: 
who is at risk” (2005) 71:2 Health Policy 181. 
89. Flood, Tuohy & Stabile, supra note 55. 
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V.  A Middle Road of Reasonableness Review? 
Perhaps it is time that Canadian courts change tack and play a more 
active role in holding governments accountable for decisions about 
what to include in the Medicare basket. As Jackman notes, “every major 
health system review undertaken in Canada over the past decade has 
concluded with a call for improved health care accountability,”90 yet it 
remains unclear from whence this accountability will originate.  At a 
macro level, the federal government is ostensibly charged with ensuring 
that provinces comply with principles of comprehensiveness, universality 
and so on, backed by the threat of fi nancial penalties as authorized by the 
Canada Health Act. Yet the only enforcement action taken by the federal 
government to date has been with respect to user fees and extra-billing, 
and even on this score, there has been growing passivity.91 A key problem 
here is that the only available enforcement mechanism under the CHA 
– withholding of federal transfers – is likely to exacerbate problems 
associated with wait times and rationing.    
Rather than start from the premise that the Constitution does not 
confer a free standing constitutional right to health care, courts might 
begin with a basic recognition that comprehensive and universal public 
health care are in fact the embodiment of Charter values. Th is might 
entail opening the door further to positive health rights claims, placing 
the onus on government to justify denials of care and, where necessary, 
applying deference at a later stage of analysis. In this way, courts could 
assist with developing precedents and guidelines that support reasonable, 
accountable decision-making across the system as a whole, rather then 
through a blinkered focus on negative rights and ‘access to the basket.’ 
 A potential advantage of such a shift is that it would provide a 
much-needed counter-balance against regressive Chaoulli-style claims. As 
the issue of access to private insurance for medically necessary care was 
framed under the existing doctrinal paradigm, the claimant’s section 7 
rights were balanced against ‘mere’ policy objectives (i.e. maintaining 
Medicare’s universality) with predictable results: given the complex 
90. Jackman, “Charter Review”, supra note 25 at 29. 
91. Lahey, supra note 87 at 48-50. 
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and uncertain causal dynamics within health systems, governments 
faced a formidable challenge in proving that a ban on private insurance 
was necessary for the protection of the public tier. Yet surely it is more 
consonant with Charter values, and Canadian public opinion, to frame 
this as a question of ‘reconciling’ the negative rights of those demanding 
privately fi nanced care against the positive rights of those dependent on 
Medicare. In concrete terms, reframing this as an issue of reconciling 
rights would increase the evidentiary burden on those asserting negative 
health care rights in a way that threatens principles of universality and 
solidarity. As Justice Iacobucci has explained, 
Under s. 1, the state must justify a violation of an individual’s Charter rights.  
When reconciling competing Charter rights, on the other hand, a court seeks 
to reconcile the constitutionally guaranteed rights of one individual with those 
of another. Consequently, the onus of proof in each of these cases plays out 
somewhat diff erently. Under section 1, the party challenging the impugned 
law must establish a prima facie encroachment of a Charter right. Th e state 
then bears the serious onus of defending or justifying the violation … In the 
reconciling context, there is no rule about onus per se.92  
Th e concern of course will be that recognition of positive rights in 
this context opens a Pandora’s box, leading to the courts micromanaging 
Medicare. Really though, the question is not whether courts should 
be deferential in adjudicating rights to health care, but how that line 
of deference should be drawn. Experience from similarly situated 
countries suggests that courts can play an important oversight role 
without micromanaging health care policy. Short of ordering funding for 
particular therapies, courts can scrutinize the process by which rationing 
decisions are made, and through evolving jurisprudence, develop 
guidelines, tests and criteria to ensure ongoing accountability in this 
regard.93 For example, the ‘Hard Look’ judicial review approach, which 
has emerged over the past decade in UK administrative law jurisprudence, 
focuses on ensuring that decision-making processes adhere to principles 
of procedural fairness, and considers all relevant factors while excluding 
92. Justice Frank Iacobucci, “‘Reconciling Rights’: Th e Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Approach to Competing Charter Rights” (2003) 20 Sup Ct L 
Rev (2d) 137 at 141-42.
93. Lorne Sossin, “Towards a Two-Tier Constitution? Th e Poverty of Health 
Rights” in Flood, Roach & Sossin, supra note 7 at 172. 
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irrelevant ones.94 Reviewing individual claims, courts look to ensure that 
the decision-making process has attended to the nature and seriousness 
of the illness; the cogency of the evidence that the treatment works; 
the extent and likelihood that it will work in this patient; the extent of 
improvement it might be expected to provide; and the absolute cost of 
the treatment.95 Chris Newdick explains that judicial prodding, focusing 
on these factors, has incrementally driven improved accountability across 
the National Health Service (NHS) as a whole – culminating in the 
codifi cation of guidelines in an NHS Constitution: 
Th e number of cases was limited and, at least at fi rst, their impact on the NHS 
as a whole was small. However … as the cases accumulated, they exercised 
greater infl uence collectively. As the consistency of the courts’ response made 
the giving  of legal advice to health authorities more straightforward (and 
legal case became increasingly newsworthy), the government responded by 
publishing the NHS Constitution … which reduces the cases to a single code 
of good practice and cements patients’ rights.96 
VI. Conclusion
Th e aspiration of health care rights is to improve the health of all 
but particularly to improve upon the health of the most vulnerable. 
Recognizing health care rights in developing and middle-income 
countries may be a galvanizing force for progressive changes, supporting 
and nurturing a radical shift in how resources are allocated to ensure better 
access for the most vulnerable. But this is not a linear task, and assuming 
that litigation of health care rights can achieve this goal underestimates 
the complexity of dealing with issues such as access to justice, the prospect 
that litigation can distort the socially fair allocation of public resources, 
the appropriate respective role for courts and governments in health care 
decision-making and the need for public and policy support for any 
particular judgment to be implemented on the ground.
In the Canadian context, courts have taken a very conservative 
approach to the question of health care rights and in only one section 15 
94. Chris Newdick, “Promoting Access and Equity in Health: Assessing the 
National Health Service in England” in Flood & Gross, supra note 18 at 
118-19 [forthcoming].  
95. Ibid. 
96. Ibid at 122. 
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case has the Supreme Court found that a government should publicly 
fund a treatment. In all other relevant cases, the Court has only found a 
“negative” right in the sense of requiring that government laws or policies 
acting as barriers to the consumption of health care be removed. Th is 
conservative approach has now even gone so far as to uphold a challenge 
to provincial laws banning private health insurance, passed in order to 
ensure equity and universality in Canadian Medicare. We think the 
Court has now passed beyond the boundary of showing deference to 
governmental decision-making in not interpreting section 7 positive 
rights and crossed the void into attacking values that we see at the core 
of the Charter – equality, access and universality in public Medicare. We 
recommend that Canadian courts consider, in future Charter challenges 
to public Medicare, that the issue is one of competing rights; any right 
a petitioner may have to access private care must be weighed against 
the rights of other Canadians to enjoy a universal, access and equitable 
public health care system. Th is would at least attenuate to some degree 
the extent to which governments are tasked with the near-impossible 
task of adducing empirical evidence to show that there are no lesser 
means by which goals of equity, universality and access can be achieved 
in the Canadian context. Further, we would support that most health 
care cases be reviewed fi rst through administrative law on grounds that 
this approach – requiring fair and transparent processes in government 
decision-making and overall reasonableness of the fi nal decision – is by 
far the best way for courts to play a role in realizing Canadians’ rights in 
health care.
